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BOOK REVIEW
Property Rights Versus Eminent Domain
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EMINENT DOMAIN. By Ellen
Frankel Paul. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books.
1987. Pp. 276.
Reviewed by Eric Mack*
Those pleased or enraged by Richard Epstein's recent book, Takings. PrivateProperty and the Power of Eminent Domain,1 have more
of the same reactions in store for them in Ellen Frankel Paul's book,
PropertyRights and Eminent Domain.2 This is not to say that Paul's
forceful essay is itself merely more of the same. Rather, it is a more
internally consistent, and yet more radical, critique of legislative and
judicial practices that trespass upon the rights of private property
than Epstein's unconventional, pro-property approach in Takings.
Although, like Epstein's work, PropertyRights and Eminent Domain
ranges over political philosophy and constitutional theory, Paul's
greater consistency and radicalism flow from the character of her
political doctrine and the role she assigns to it.
Her political philosophy in this ambitious and valuable work is a
streamlined and hardnosed Lockean-Nozickian doctrine that affirms
extralegal individual rights to person, liberty, and property.3 Any serviceable morality must assign rights with respect to persons.4 The
only coherent assignment of such rights, consistent with moral equality among persons, ascribes to each a right over himself. Individual
property rights in external objects rest initially on human creativity
and on the right of the self-owning creator to his product.5 These
* Associate Professor of Philosophy, Tulane University.
1. R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN

(1985).
2. E. PAUL, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EMINENT DOMAIN (1987).

3. Id. at 185-245. See generally J. LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government, in Two
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (P. Laslett ed. 1967); R. NozICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND
UTOPIA (1974).

4. E. PAUL, supra note 2, at 206-09, 224-27. See generally Paul & Paul, Locke's
Usufructary Theory of Self-Ownership, 61 PAC. PHIL. Q. 384 (1980).
5. E. PAUL, supra note 2, at 227-37. For a theory similar to Paul's-although one which
is not wholly defensible in Paul's view-see Kirzner, Entrepreneurship, Entitlement, and
Economic Justice, in READING NOZICK 383 (J. Paul ed. 1981). Paul differs from Kirzner
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rights to objects that are created from nature are not compromised by
any Lockean proviso that says that "enough and as good ' 6 of nature
must remain for others. According to Paul, all such provisos flow
from an unjustified belief in a primitive common ownership of nature,
a belief that Locke associated with the idea that God had given the
earth to all men in common. 7 Paul strongly contrasts the natural
rights tradition within which she operates with both utilitarian and
social contract theories of morality and politics. She systematically
attacks the idea that aggregate goals, such as general happiness and
wealth maximization, can either be coherently articulated or used to
vindicate any infringements upon the moral side-constraints defined
by individuals' rights. Contractarianism is not available as a substitute for God for the purpose of grounding politically enforceable positive duties to others or for providing the government with the right to
engage in any activities other than the protection of individuals' absolute rights.' Government is legitimate only insofar as it serves to protect these rights. 9
Essentially, political philosophy calls the tune, constitutional theory dances. More specifically, political philosophy calls both an
"ideal world" and a "real world" tune.' Streamlined Lockean philosophy provides us with objectively correct, extralegal answers to
questions about the moral permissibility of state action. The only permissible exercises of police power are those that prevent A from
inflicting unchosen damage on B's health or safety. And Paul's political philosophy finds all nondefensive takings of A's property, whether
or not it is for something called the public good or public use, to be
morally impermissible. Thus, an ideal world constitution would grant
government only a highly restricted police power and would ban any
takings for the public use even if they were subject to compensation. "
In effect, if a governmental constraint on a property right, or any
other right, can be justified by a narrowly construed Millian Harm
Principle-one construed more narrowly than by Mill himself-it is
permissible under the police power. If it cannot be so justified, it is
impermissible, even if compensation is given.
insofar as his theory would allow a shift in ownership based on a person's ability to perceive a
new use for property.
6. J. LOCKE, supra note 3, at 309.
7. E. PAUL, supra note 2, at 202-06; see J. LOCKE, supra note 3, at 327 (God "has given
the Earth to the Children of Men, given it to mankind in common.").
8. E. PAUL, supra note 2, at 185-87, 212-24.

9. Id. at 248-54.
10. Id. at 254-66.
11. Id. at 254-60.
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Of course, this ideal world constitution is not our Constitution.
And even if it were-even if our best theory of constitutional interpretation were capable of showing that the essence of the Constitution is
its underlying allegiance to streamlined Lockean rights while all else
is to be explained away-neither legislators nor judges would
acknowledge that happy interpretive discovery. For the real world, it
12
is unrealistic to call for an absolute restriction on the police power.
So, aside from advocating the ideal restriction of the police power to
prevent A from harming B, Paul urges that the real world police
power should be subject to strict judicial scrutiny. "The presumption
of validity adhering to police power measures . . . ought to be seriously reevaluated.... [S]tates should have to demonstrate that a compelling state interest overrides individuals' economic liberties." 3
Further, there is no denying the real world existence of the takings
clause. But in this world, the takings clause can be useful. For putative police power restrictions that are not "pressing instances of protecting the public health and safety" 4 ought to be construed as
takings that trigger a claim to compensation. But while eminent
domain is thereby revitalized insofar as it invades the territory now
governed by the more oppressive police power, it is to be driven back
from private property that is taken under the guise of public use from
A for the purposes or good of B. The use must be genuinely public,
and as in all other matters, the courts should not defer to legislators'
proclamations about the public character or the constitutional value
of their needs.
So stands the basic doctrine of Paul's Property Rights and Eminent Domain. But more needs to be said about the complex and interesting structure, interconnections, and arguments of this book. As
our framework, we can employ Paul Freund's characterizations of the
eminent domain and police powers: "It may be said that the state
takes property by eminent domain because it is useful to the public,
and under the police power because it is harmful." 5 Freund's characterizations provide an outline of what Paul herself explicitly pursues, namely, a theoretical distinction between the police and eminent
domain powers. Harmfulness straightforwardly vindicates state
restriction in the form of state taking without need of compensation.
But mere public utility cannot justify seizing an individual's property
or constraining his activities without compensation. If the restraint is
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 261-66.
Id. at 264.
Id.
Id. at 138 (quoting P.

FREUND, THE POLICE POWER

546-47 (1904)).
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not for the purpose of preventing harm, then if it may be imposed at
all, it must be for a genuine public use, and the public must pay for its
benefits.
Any given theorist's substantive position can be seen to be the
application to this framework of that theorist's conceptions of
"harm," "public use," and the moral weight ascribed to the public
benefit achieved through public use. Paul's extended defense of Lockean rights to person, liberty, and property represent her account of
what should count as "harm," namely, only actions that encroach on
these rights. It is no accident that the environmentalist moral theories
that are attacked in the opening chapter of this volume have been
associated with so much of the recent land-use and zoning practices
that Paul opposes. They represent alternative and far more inclusive
conceptions of rights and harms. If trees or snaildarters have moral
rights, then the basic framework that Paul accepts would require that
they be protected against "aggressive" human development, however
socially useful that development may be. Similarly, if as asserted by
one county zoning department in the general tradition of Locke's proviso, " 'The land belongs to the people ... a little of it to those dead
...some to those living.., but most of it belongs to those yet to be
born,' "6 Paul's insistence on absolute respect for property rights
would require the most extreme no-growth policies. Thus, Paul's able
critique of these moral theories is essential, given her own view of the
"ideal" and "real" world role of the police power. And, with respect
to the latter part of the Freudian framework, Paul's anti-utilitarian
and antiwealth maximization arguments accord with her ideal world
position that no public benefit achieved through the public use of
what is currently A's property has enough moral weight to override
A's moral rights.
Still, it is not much of a constitutional theory to say that in an
ideal libertarian world there would be a highly restricted police power
and no power of eminent domain. It is not much of a resolution of
our "constitutional muddle"17-a muddle the history of which her
lengthy and illuminating second chapter is devoted to documenting' 8-to say, even if it is true, that in an ideal world only part of
one of the muddled elements will be around. How much of a resolution of this undeniable muddle is, then, provided within Paul's real
world conclusions? The answer, I think, is not as much as Paul seeks
16. Id. (quoting Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 24 n.6, 201 N.W.2d 761, 771 n.6

(Wis. 1972)).
17. Id. at 247-48.
18. Id. at 71-184.
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when she indicates that her ambition is to identify theoretically distinct bases for the two powers.
Surely Paul is correct to insist that not every use, not even every
use that advances aggregate utility or wealth, should count as a public
use.-1 9 But her proposed restriction on public use, and hence, on the
legitimate real world employment of eminent domain seems ill-suited
to her purposes and disconnected with the central feature of eminent
domain. Eminent domain bypasses the normal requirement for antecedent negotiation about and agreement on the terms of exchange.
Paul asserts that "we ought to limit eminent domain to a narrow
range of strictly public uses; highways, post offices, government buildings, courthouses, and the like." 2 ° But, if the idea here is that a taking
is for public use as long as what is taken is then owned or used by
government, Paul will only be encouraging governments to expand
the scope of public property and public management of the properties
that are currently conveyed through eminent domain proceedings to
private redevelopers. Alternatively, if the idea here is that a taking is
for public use as long as what is taken is widely used by "the public,"
then takings that Paul would want to prohibit, such as for mass audience sports complexes, amusement parks, and fast-food outlets, would
qualify as public use takings.
Paul needs a better second-best doctrine of eminent domain-one
that has a theoretically distinct rationale, while not being utterly
abhorrent in its character or in its implications to her libertarian ideals. For her purposes, a nice second-best doctrine would put most
resource acquisitions, e.g., site acquisitions for "post offices, government buildings, courthouses, and the like,"'" on the same footing as
acquisitions of sites for McDonald's and Pizza Hut, while reserving
eminent domain to such traditional categories as highways and dams.
A natural candidate for such a rationale would seem to be the view
that takings accompanied by compensation are justified only when
such forced exchanges accomplish what the many holders of the parcels of land needed for a highway or a dam, and the many beneficiaries of the highway or dam who hold funds sufficient to pay for
those parcels would have chosen to accomplish had bargaining among
them been feasible. The idea, of course, is that there are circumstances in which, because of transaction costs that may arise out of
the self-defeating strategic incentives faced by the parties, mutually
beneficial exchanges-exchanges that otherwise would have been cho19. Id. at 261-66.

20. Id. at 266.
21. Id.
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sen-are not arrived at through uncoerced negotiation. Government
employment of the eminent domain power might even be represented
as artificially enhancing property rights by enabling property holders
to overcome these market defects.2 2
Under this view, a taking would legitimately be for public use
only if all the rightholders affected were net beneficiaries-meaning
that just compensation would have to do more than make the parties
whole-and the mutual benefits would not have been secured without
government coercion. Eminent domain would accord with Freund's
characterization of it as vindicated by its benefiting A and B rather
than its preventing A from harming B. 2 3 The requirement that beneficiaries of takings pay for their benefits on the model of the beneficiaries of free exchange, and that such a taking only occur when
comparable free exchange is not feasible, would seem to place difficult
hurdles before any eminent domainer. And, according to Paul's view,
the judiciary should closely review whether state activities surmount
these hurdles.
Nevertheless, it is not clear that Paul would welcome this "transaction costs" construction of real world eminent domain. Paul would
be quick to point out that it places no principled restriction on the
purposes for which eminent domain may be used.24 If normal market
negotiations between General Motors and the Poletowners were genuinely infeasible and the Poletowners were to be more adequately compensated, this doctrine would seem to justify Detroit's condemnation
of Poletown.2 5 Moreover, as indicated in her discussion of the success
of nonzoning in Houston,26 Paul is certain to be duly suspicious of
claims about "market failure" and their political use. Perhaps, if
pressed further about her real world notion of public use, Paul could
turn more extensively to the historical, albeit nontheoretical, use of
this notion that encompasses such traditionally accepted "public
works" as roadways and waterways, but not industrial enterprises or
ecologically sacrosanct zones.27 Such a historical recourse to the
22. R. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 332.
23. E. PAUL, supra note 2, at 138.
24. Id. at 214-24. For examples of the economic theory of property rights that Paul
rejects, see R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1972); Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960); Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. EcON.
REV. 347 (1967); Posner, The Ethical and PoliticalBasis of the Efficiency Norm in Common
Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980); Posner, Utilitarianism,Economics, and
Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979).
25. E. PAUL, supra note 2, at 32-37; see Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of
Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981).
26. E. PAUL, supra note 2, at 259-60.
27. Id. at 266.
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minds of the Founders and their political vision certainly would parallel Paul's final appeal to the courts, in the name of "the plain intent
of the Constitution," to stand against "government's propensity to
seek the public good at the expense of trenching upon property
rights." 8

28. Id.

